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MAKING SENSE OF SCHAUMBURG:
SEEKING COHERENCE IN FIRST
AMENDMENT CHARITABLE
SOLICITATION LAW
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The Supreme Court shaped its approach to charitable solicitation in a trilogy of cases in the
1980s: Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment (1980), Secretary of State of
Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co. (1984), and Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of
North Carolina (1988).

Owing largely to ambiguity surrounding the concepts of content

analysis, tiered scrutiny, and commercial speech emerging during that era, the Court failed to
articulate a coherent framework for evaluating regulations of charitable solicitation. The result
has left the Court without a clear rationale for the value of charitable solicitation and lower
courts without a workable test for evaluating regulations affecting this form of speech: the
Eighth and Tenth Circuits interpret Schaumburg as an intermediate scrutiny test, the Third and
Eleventh Circuits view it as a strict scrutiny test, and the Fourth Circuit has simply noted that the
Court has been “unclear” about the appropriate standard.
After examining the Court’s approach to charitable solicitation, I propose a new test that
incorporates current notions of content analysis and tiered scrutiny and better accounts for the
speaker-based interests tied to charitable solicitation. My normative approach adopts a “civic
conception of free speech” that is cognizant of the matters of public concern advanced both
directly and indirectly through charitable solicitation. I conclude that a balancing of interests
offers a more appropriate review of charitable solicitation regulation than the cumbersome
formulations arising out of the Schaumburg trilogy.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.
II.
III.

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................552
CONTENT ANALYSIS, TIERED SCRUTINY, AND
COMMERCIAL SPEECH ....................................................................553
THE CHARITABLE SOLICITATION CASES .....................................560
A. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Environment ..............................................................................560
B. Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co.....561

∗
J.D., Duke University School of Law; Ph.D., University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill. Thanks to Jeff Powell, Peter Ahlin, Tim Kuhner, John Fred, and Lauren Kummerer for
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article.

INAZU 12

552

IV.

V.

4/14/2009 3:23:35 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[92:551

C. Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North
Carolina, Inc...............................................................................563
D. Revisiting Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley...........................565
E. Subsequent Cases .......................................................................573
A NEW TEST FOR CHARITABLE SOLICITATION...........................575
A. The First Amendment Value of Charitable Solicitation .........576
1. Solicitation and Advocacy ..................................................576
2. The Distinctions Within Charitable Solicitation..............579
3. The Disparate Effects of Content-Neutral Regulation...581
B. The Need for Balancing ............................................................583
C. Formulating a New Test ............................................................584
CONCLUSION .....................................................................................587

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court shaped its approach to charitable solicitation in
a trilogy of cases in the 1980s: Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a
1
Better Environment, Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H.
2
Munson Co., and Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North
3
Carolina. Owing largely to ambiguity surrounding the concepts of
content analysis, tiered scrutiny, and commercial speech emerging
during that era, the Court failed to articulate a coherent framework for
evaluating regulations of charitable solicitation. The result has left lower
courts unable to judge “the ends which the several rules seek to
accomplish, the reasons why those ends are desired, what is given up to
4
gain them, and whether they are worth the price.” The Eighth and
Tenth Circuits interpret Schaumburg as an intermediate scrutiny test,
the Third and Eleventh Circuits view it as a strict scrutiny test, and the
Fourth Circuit has simply noted that the Court has been “unclear”
about the appropriate standard. The lack of doctrinal coherence has also
left an important form of speech without adequate First Amendment
protections.
My objective in this Article is to articulate a framework for
reviewing charitable solicitation regulation that better accounts for the
important democratic values of this kind of speech. This requires
1. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
2. 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
3. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
4. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897), reprinted
in 110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 1007 (1997).
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understanding the relationship between charitable solicitation and
related First Amendment concepts. I begin by reviewing the state of
three of these concepts—content analysis, tiered scrutiny, and
commercial speech—when the Court decided Schaumburg in 1980. In
Part III, I review the Court’s charitable solicitation decisions. Part IV
proposes an alternative test to that constructed under the SchaumburgMunson-Riley trilogy. My normative approach accounts for the
speaker-based interests related to charitable solicitation and builds upon
a “civic conception of free speech” that better ensures “broad
communication about matters of public concern” advanced both directly
5
and indirectly through charitable solicitation.
I contend that a
balancing of interests rooted in a concern for democratic discourse
offers a more principled and more cogent review of charitable
solicitation regulation than the cumbersome formulations applied today.
II. CONTENT ANALYSIS, TIERED SCRUTINY, AND COMMERCIAL
SPEECH
6

7

Content analysis and tiered scrutiny emerged independently of one
another in First Amendment law. The latter originated in the equal
protection context: by the early 1970s, commentators had observed that
the Court applied strict scrutiny to classifications that were suspect or
involved a fundamental interest while subjecting all other statutes to a
8
“standard of minimal rationality.” Because speech was deemed to be a
5. CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 19, 28 (2d ed.
1995).
6. Government regulation of expressive activity is content-neutral when justified without
reference to the content of speech. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
Whether a restriction is content-based or content-neutral is not always readily discernible.
See Wilson R. Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of Laws That Are Both Content-Based
and Content-Neutral: The Emerging Constitutional Calculus, 79 IND. L.J. 801, 809 (2004)
(“[T]he distinction between content-based and content-neutral laws is too amorphous to
serve as a determinative test of constitutionality.”); see also Martin H. Redish, The Content
Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981) (the use of content
distinction is “both theoretically questionable and difficult to apply”); Geoffrey R. Stone,
Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions,
46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 107 (1978) (“[S]ince content-neutral, like content-based, restrictions
may at times have a differential impact or reflect a latent government hostility toward certain
ideas, the differences between these two types of restrictions often seem to be differences
more of degree than of kind.”).
7. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (strict
scrutiny); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) (intermediate scrutiny).
8. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (“The Warren
Court embraced a rigid two-tier attitude. Some situations evoked the aggressive ‘new’ equal
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fundamental liberty interest under the First Amendment, the Court
9
evaluated regulations of most forms of speech under strict scrutiny.
As the Court assimilated tiered scrutiny into its First Amendment
doctrine, it limited its application of strict scrutiny to regulations that
discriminated based upon the content of speech. This distinction first
appeared in the 1972 decision Police Department of City of Chicago v.
Mosley, which involved a Chicago ordinance prohibiting picketing or
demonstrating on a public way within 150 feet of any school but
exempting “the peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor
10
Mosley challenged the ordinance on equal protection
dispute.”
grounds, and the Court rejected the City’s distinction between labor
11
picketing and other peaceful picketing. Regulations based on content
12
were “never permitted” and would be subjected to a high degree of
13
scrutiny.

protection, with scrutiny that was ‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact; in other contexts, the
deferential ‘old’ equal protection reigned, with minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none
in fact.”).
9. The Court made an important distinction in 1942 when it clarified that categories of
speech were either protected or unprotected. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571–72 (1942). Regulations of speech in the latter category were of little constitutional
concern. Id. (“[S]uch utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”); see also LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 670 (1st ed. 1978) (“From the dictum in
Chaplinsky the Supreme Court had gradually derived what became known as the two-level
theory of the first amendment, recognizing speech at one level as fully entitled to first
amendment protection and relegating to a lower level speech so worthless as to be beyond the
constitutional ken.”).
10. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 93 (1972). Stephen Gottlieb contends
that Mosley “reinterpreted [past] cases in terms of the obligation of government to remain
neutral with respect to the content of speech.” Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Speech Clause and
the Limits of Neutrality, 51 ALB. L. REV. 19, 24 (1986).
11. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 94.
12. Id. at 99. Noting that “the equal protection claim in this case is closely intertwined
with First Amendment interests,” the Court concluded that “[t]he central problem with
Chicago’s ordinance is that it describes permissible picketing in terms of its subject matter.”
Id. at 95, 99.
13. Kenneth Karst has observed that Mosley marked the Court’s first full
acknowledgment that a content-based regulation was particularly odious because it violated
“the principle of equal liberty of expression . . . inherent in the first amendment.” Kenneth L.
Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 26
(1975). Karst contends that “[t]he absence of a clear articulation of the principle of equal
liberty of expression in Supreme Court decisions before Mosley may be attributable to a
belief that the principle is so obviously central among first amendment values that it requires
no explanation.” Id. at 29.
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Contemporaneously with Mosley, the Court reconsidered its twofold regime of strict and rational basis scrutiny. Writing of the 1971
Term that included Mosley, Gerald Gunther suggested that there was
“mounting discontent” with two-tiered scrutiny and that the Court was
prepared to intervene in some circumstances with something less than
14
strict scrutiny. Gunther presaged that an “intensified means scrutiny
would, in short, close the wide gap between the strict scrutiny of the new
equal protection and the minimal scrutiny of the old not by abandoning
the strict but by raising the level of the minimal from virtual abdication
15
to genuine judicial inquiry.”
Gunther’s prediction of an emerging intermediate scrutiny was
consistent with the adumbrations of the Court’s 1968 decision in United
16
States v. O’Brien.
O’Brien, a case involving “expressive conduct,”
announced a previously unseen standard of review:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
17
interest.
Writing about O’Brien in 1975, John Hart Ely commented: “[T]he
Court is surely to be commended for here attempting something it

14. Gunther, supra note 8, at 12.
15. Id. at 24. Several years after Gunther’s article, the Court began extending a lesser
degree of scrutiny toward speech regulations that it concluded were not based on content. In
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., the Court
noted that it had “often approved” time, place, and manner restrictions “provided that they
are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they serve a
significant governmental interest, and that in so doing they leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information.” 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (emphasis added).
The term “content-neutral” also entered the Court’s lexicon. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S.
348, 368 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (referring to a “content-neutral time, place, and
manner restriction”); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 84 (1976) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (same).
16. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
17. Id. This new test was consistent with the jurisprudential developments in equal
protection analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S.
495, 503–04 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75–76 (1971).
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attempts too seldom, the statement of a coherent and applicable test.”
But Ely observed that O’Brien’s language revealed an ambiguity in the
19
Court’s strict scrutiny test.
Prior to O’Brien, strict scrutiny review
upheld a speech regulation only if there were no “less restrictive means”
20
available. Ely noted that this phrase could be either strongly or weakly
21
construed. Strongly construed, the test would invalidate almost any
regulation because, as Justice Blackmun observed four years later, “[a]
judge would be unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with
something a little less ‘drastic’ or a little less ‘restrictive’ in almost any
22
Weakly construed, some regulations would survive
situation.”
23
review. O’Brien substituted the phrase “no greater than is essential”
24
for “less restrictive means” and upheld the defendant’s criminal
25
conviction for violating a speech regulation. Ely concluded that the
analysis and result were consistent with the weak formulation of strict
26
scrutiny. He suggested that this weak formulation “turned out to be
no protection at all,” and he equated O’Brien’s review to rational basis
27
scrutiny. Here, his otherwise trenchant analysis was exaggerated. The
plain language of O’Brien indicated something beyond minimal
28
scrutiny. The case signaled the emergence of an intermediate standard

18. John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1484 (1975). Ely
foreshadowed a broad applicability of the new test, observing that O’Brien’s standard was
“not limited to cases involving so-called ‘symbolic speech.’” Id.
19. According to Ely, the fourth prong of O’Brien’s test “involves a choice between
different conceptions of [the ‘no greater than is essential’] standard, a choice made by
reference to factors neither O’Brien nor any other Supreme Court decision has yet made
explicit.” Id.
20. Id. at 1484–85.
21. Id.
22. Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188 (1979)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
23. Ely wrote that “this weak formulation would reach only laws that engage in the
gratuitous inhibition of expression, requiring only that a prohibition not outrun the interest it
is designed to serve.” Ely, supra note 18, at 1485.
24. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
25. Id.
26. “Further language in the O’Brien opinion, and the holding of the case, indicate that
[the weak formulation] is the strongest form of less restrictive alternative analysis in which,
under the circumstances, the Court was prepared to engage.” Ely, supra note 18, at 1485.
27. Id. at 1486 n.18.
28. In 1984, the Court characterized O’Brien as “little, if any, different from the
[intermediate scrutiny] standard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions.” Clark v.
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984); see also Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 797–98 (1989).
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of review that was less than strict scrutiny but greater than rational basis
29
review.
Although the Court initially failed to classify O’Brien as an
intermediate scrutiny test, it tightened its strict scrutiny definition in two
First Amendment decisions issued the year after Ely’s article,
supplanting the settled “less restrictive means” with the previously
30
unseen “least restrictive means.” The slight language shift ensured that
the Court’s strict scrutiny test was no longer vulnerable to the weak
formulation that Ely had exposed.
Ely observed that O’Brien’s crucial inquiry was its second prong—
whether the governmental interest was unrelated to the suppression of
31
free expression. A regulation that failed to satisfy this prong was not
per se unconstitutional, but the Court’s analysis would be “switched
32
33
That other track was strict scrutiny.
The
onto another track.”
conclusion that a regulation related to the suppression of free expression
(i.e., a content-based regulation) required strict scrutiny was the same

29. A similar development was evolving more explicitly in the Court’s equal protection
analysis. A 1977 Note in the Harvard Law Review observed that “[m]any commentators
ha[d] noted the emergence from the Supreme Court of an intermediate standard of scrutiny
in equal protection analysis, more deferential than the ‘strict scrutiny’ exercised in challenges
to suspect classifications and classifications impinging on fundamental rights, but more
exacting than the ‘rational basis’ test traditionally applied to economic and social welfare
legislation.” Note, Intermediate Standard of Review, 91 HARV. L. REV. 177, 177 (1977).
Although this intermediate scrutiny in equal protection analysis was strikingly similar to the
new O’Brien standard for expressive speech jurisprudence, the Court had not yet linked the
concepts when it decided Schaumburg.
30. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 372 (1976) (“Though there is a vital need for
government efficiency and effectiveness, such dismissals are on balance not the least
restrictive means for fostering that end.”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68 (1976)
(“[D]isclosure requirements—certainly in most applications—appear to be the least
restrictive means of curbing the evils of campaign ignorance and corruption that Congress
found to exist”). Buckley and Elrod were the Court’s earliest uses of the phrase “least
restrictive means.” Three years later, in Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers
Party, the Court asserted that it had previously “required that States adopt the least drastic
means to achieve their ends.” 440 U.S. 173, 185 (1979). The Court supported this somewhat
apocryphal claim by citing two previous decisions: Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974),
and Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31–33 (1968). Rhodes contained no discussion about the
burden that a regulation could place on a protected interest. Lubin noted that a “legitimate
state interest . . . must be achieved by a means that does not unfairly or unnecessarily
burden . . . an . . . important interest.” 415 U.S. at 716. Neither case supported the principle
that strict scrutiny required the “least drastic means.”
31. Ely, supra note 18, at 1484.
32. Id. Tribe uses the “track” terminology in his analysis of communication and
expression. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 580–688.
33. Ely, supra note 18, at 1484.
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34

conclusion that Mosley had reached.
But Mosley had failed to
distinguish O’Brien’s more relaxed test from strict scrutiny. Ely clarified
the distinction by inferring not only the connection between contentbased regulation and strict scrutiny but also its converse: content-neutral
35
regulations were subject to something less than strict scrutiny. The
Court, however, had not yet adopted the term “intermediate scrutiny,”
and the litmus for content-neutrality had not yet become whether a
36
regulation was unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Ely’s
analytical prescience about the link between content-neutrality and
intermediate scrutiny likely went unrecognized because the relevant
descriptive terms were not yet embedded in the Court’s vernacular.
The terminology, however, was close at hand. In 1978, Laurence
Tribe observed that “[w]here government aims at the
noncommunicative impact of an act [i.e., when the regulation is not
content-based], the correct result in any particular case thus reflects
37
some ‘balancing’ of the competing interests.” Several months later,
Geoffrey Stone, in the first of three articles that tracked the
development of the Court’s content analysis doctrine in the 1970s and
the 1980s, explained that “[g]overnmental restrictions of expression may
be divided into two general categories—content-neutral restrictions and
38
content-based restrictions.” Stone observed that the Court subjected
content-based restrictions of “fully protected” expression to “a
stringently speech-protective set of standards” and upheld such
39
regulations “in only the most extraordinary circumstances.”
Conversely, the Court reviewed content-neutral restrictions with “a
balancing of first amendment interests against competing government
40
Thus, only two years before the Court’s landmark
concerns.”
charitable solicitation decision in Schaumburg, commentators had

34. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972).
35. Ely, supra note 18, at 1484.
36. The Court clarified the latter in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989).
37. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 581. Tribe traces the roots of the academic debate between
absolutist protection and balancing to the early 1960s. See id. at 582–83 n.19.
38. Stone, supra note 6, at 81. The other two articles are Geoffrey R. Stone, Content
Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983), and Geoffrey R.
Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987).
39. Stone, supra note 6, at 82.
40. Id. at 81; see also Daniel A. Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A
Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727, 762 (1980) (Review of content-neutral regulation “consists
of a middle-tier equal protection test, similar to that used in cases of discrimination on the
basis of gender or illegitimacy, coupled with a controlled balancing test.”).
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zeroed in on the emergence of an intermediate scrutiny balancing test
for content-neutral regulations of protected speech.
One other emerging concept affected the context in which the Court
examined Schaumburg: commercial speech analysis, “a notoriously
41
unstable and contentious domain of First Amendment jurisprudence.”
Since its 1942 decision in Valentine v. Chrestensen, the Court had viewed
42
commercial speech as unprotected.
In the mid-1970s, the Court
43
reversed this classification in two decisions, Bigelow v. Virginia and
Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
44
Inc.
After Virginia Board of Pharmacy, the Court protected
commercial speech, but the degree of that protection remained unclear
because commercial speech was not “wholly undifferentiable from other
45
forms” of speech. As Justice Powell elaborated in Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass’n:
To require a parity of constitutional protection for
commercial and noncommercial speech alike could invite
dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the
Amendment’s guarantee with respect to the latter kind
of speech. Rather than subject the First Amendment to
such a devitalization, we instead have afforded
commercial speech a limited measure of protection,
commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale
of First Amendment values, while allowing modes of
regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of
46
noncommercial expression.
Commercial speech, then, although within the realm of First
Amendment protection, was something less than fully protected speech.
The distinction created a conundrum. Under the old two-tiered
scrutiny, the Court subjected regulation of protected speech to strict
scrutiny and regulation of unprotected speech to rational basis scrutiny.
41. Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2
(2000).
42. 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (“[T]he Constitution imposes no such restraint on government
as respects purely commercial advertising.”), overruled by Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
43. 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975).
44. 425 U.S. 748, 780 (1976).
45. Id. at 771 n.24.
46. 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
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With the advent of content analysis, the Court applied a form of
intermediate scrutiny to content-neutral regulation of protected speech.
But what about content-neutral regulation of commercial speech? No
longer unprotected, commercial speech merited something other than
rational basis scrutiny. But because commercial speech was not “wholly
undifferentiable” from other forms of protected speech, it did not
warrant the same degree of protection as these other forms.
III. THE CHARITABLE SOLICITATION CASES
The appearance of content analysis, tiered scrutiny, and a new
understanding to commercial speech during the 1970s provided the
context in which the Court formulated its approach to charitable
solicitation in Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley. I now turn to these
cases.
A. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment
Schaumburg addressed a city ordinance that prohibited door-to-door
or on-street solicitation by an organization that did not use at least 75%
47
of donations for “charitable purposes.” The Village of Schaumburg
offered three justifications for its regulation: policing fraud, protecting
48
public safety and protecting residential privacy. The Court concluded
that the “legitimate interest” in preventing fraud “[could] be better
served by measures less intrusive than a direct prohibition on
49
solicitation,” and found no “substantial relationship” between the 75%
50
requirement and the protection of public safety or residential privacy.
The village’s interests were thus only “peripherally promoted” by the
47. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 622–23 (1980). The
ordinance regulated “peddlers and solicitors,” who were defined as “any persons who, going
from place to place without appointment, offer goods or services for sale or take orders for
future delivery of goods or services.” Id. at 622 n.1. The Court devoted the bulk of its
analysis to the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine and held that the Village’s ordinance
was unconstitutionally overbroad. Id. at 635. The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine
traces its roots to Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). See Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 863 (1991). The doctrine permits someone
whose conduct may be legitimately proscribed to challenge the proscription as it applies to
others. Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 634; see Fallon, supra, at 863–67. Because overbreadth is an
“ancillary” doctrine that comports with the Court’s more substantive doctrines like content
analysis, see id. at 866–67 (citing David S. Bogen, First Amendment Ancillary Doctrines, 37
MD. L. REV. 679, 681 (1978)), Schaumburg’s principles are applicable outside the overbreadth
context.
48. Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 636, 638.
49. Id. at 637.
50. Id. at 638.
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limitation and “could be sufficiently served by measures less destructive
51
of First Amendment interests.” Although the Court never synthesized
these observations in Schaumburg, its underlying test might be
formulated as follows:
A direct and substantial regulation of door-to-door or
on-street charitable solicitation will be sustained if it
serves sufficiently strong, subordinating interests by
means of narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve
those interests without unnecessarily interfering with
52
First Amendment freedoms.
Four months after Schaumburg, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice
Blackmun, asserted in his dissent in Carey v. Brown that Schaumburg
53
had articulated a content-neutral intermediate scrutiny test. At least
54
one lower court reached the same interpretation that year, as did
55
Professor Stone in an article published three years later.
B. Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co.
Four years after Schaumburg, the Court revisited restrictions on
56
charitable solicitation in Munson. The Maryland statute at issue in
Munson, like the Schaumburg ordinance, limited the percentage of
57
charitable solicitations that charities could spend on fundraising costs.

51. Id. at 636.
52. This phrasing is derived from Stone’s characterization of Schaumburg’s test. See
Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 38, at 49–50.
53. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 476–77 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing
Schaumburg for the proposition that the Court “has upheld state authority to restrict the
time, place, and manner of speech, if those regulations ‘protect a substantial government
interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression’ and are narrowly tailored, limiting
the restrictions to those reasonably necessary to protect the substantial governmental
interest”).
54. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. City of Houston, 620 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tex. App.
1981) (citing Schaumburg for the notion that “[r]easonable restrictions on the time, place and
manner of the exercise of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights will be upheld if they are
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech and are narrowly drawn,
limiting the restrictions to those necessary to protect significant governmental interests”).
55. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, supra note 38, at 245
(intimating that the ordinance in Schaumburg was a content-neutral, speaker-based
restriction).
56. Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
57. Id. at 950. Unlike the Schaumburg ordinance, the Maryland statute included a
discretionary provision under which the Secretary of State could license a charity whose
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The statute, however, covered any “fund-raising activity” rather than
58
simply door-to-door and on-street solicitation.
The plaintiff, a
professional charitable solicitor, asserted that the statute violated his
59
rights to free speech and assembly.
Munson relied heavily on Schaumburg. Justice Blackmun explained
for the Court that the government restriction in Schaumburg had not
been “a precisely tailored means” and had borne “no necessary
60
connection” to the Village’s asserted interests. Because these phrases,
absent from Schaumburg, were not strict scrutiny terms, it appeared that
Munson was cryptically endorsing Schaumburg as an intermediate
scrutiny test. But Munson then cited Schaumburg for the strict scrutiny
proposition that certain statutes would be invalidated if they “[did] not
employ means narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental
61
Schaumburg had asserted that a restriction had to be
interest.”
62
“narrowly drawn” but had never used the strict scrutiny phrase
“narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.”
Munson thus recharacterized Schaumburg’s test as akin to strict
63
scrutiny, approximating the following:
A direct and substantial regulation of charitable
solicitation will be sustained if it furthers a compelling
governmental interest, and if the regulation is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest and does not unnecessarily
64
interfere with First Amendment freedoms.
65

Following Munson, a federal district judge, a federal appellate
66
67
judge, and the Supreme Court of Maine cited Schaumburg for the
fundraising expenditures exceeded the statutory cap if enforcing the cap would “effectively
prevent the charitable organization from raising contributions.” Id. at 962.
58. Id. at 950 n.2. In addition to door-to-door solicitation, any “fund-raising activity”
presumably encompasses solicitation ranging from telemarketing to newspaper
advertisements. At least one of the governmental interests in Schaumburg, protecting public
safety, fails to justify restrictions on these other forms of fundraising.
59. Id. at 950, 952.
60. Id. at 961.
61. Id. at 965 n.13.
62. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980).
63. Like Schaumburg, Munson never addressed whether the Maryland regulation was
content-neutral or content-based.
64. This formulation approximates the standards articulated or implied by Munson.
65. See Hornstein v. Hartigan, 676 F. Supp. 894, 897 (C.D. Ill. 1988) (citing Schaumburg
for the principle that even a compelling interest “must be drawn with the least restriction on
First Amendment freedoms”).
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strict scrutiny principle that a regulation must be the “least restrictive
means” available to accomplish a legislative purpose, a strict scrutiny
interpretation that exceeded even Munson’s recharacterization of
Schaumburg. Conversely, Stone, in an oft-cited article on content
analysis, adhered to his earlier assessment that Schaumburg articulated
68
an intermediate scrutiny test for a content-neutral regulation.
The
confusion stemming from the convergence of tiered scrutiny and content
analysis in evaluation of charitable solicitation regulation was becoming
evident.
C. Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc.
Four years after Munson, the Court examined three provisions in the
North Carolina Charitable Solicitations Act, which directly regulated
69
professional charitable solicitors. Turning first to a requirement that
the percentage of contributions retained by professional charitable
solicitors be “reasonable,” Justice Brennan began by reviewing
70
Schaumburg and Munson. Justice Brennan noted that Munson had
71
applied “exacting First Amendment scrutiny,” and concluded that
Schaumburg and Munson “teach that the solicitation of charitable
contributions is protected speech, and that using percentages to decide
the legality of the fundraiser’s fee is not narrowly tailored to the State’s

66. See Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 758 F.2d 350, 359 (9th Cir. 1984) (Norris, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Schaumburg in the context of strict scrutiny
for the principle that a state “must demonstrate that [a] regulation is ‘the least restrictive
means available that would accomplish the legislative purpose’”).
67. See State v. Me. State Troopers Ass’n, 491 A.2d 538, 542 (Me. 1985) (citing
Schaumburg for the principle that a law “must be narrowly drawn so that it is the least
restrictive means of achieving the compelling government interest”).
68. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 38, at 49–50. Stone considered
Schaumburg to correspond to a test of intermediate scrutiny under which “the Court takes
seriously the inquiries into the substantiality of the governmental interest and the availability
of less restrictive alternatives.” Id. at 52. Under this intermediate standard of review, “the
government cannot satisfy the less restrictive alternative requirement merely by
demonstrating that less restrictive measures would serve its ends ‘less effectively’ than the
challenged regulation. Rather, to withstand intermediate scrutiny, the government must
prove that its use of a less restrictive alternative would seriously undermine substantial
governmental interests.” Id. at 53.
69. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781 (1988). Unlike the regulations
in Schaumburg and Munson, the North Carolina statute was explicitly limited to professional
solicitors. Id. at 784 n.2.
70. Id. at 787–89.
71. Id. at 789.
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interest in preventing fraud.” The Court held that the reasonable fee
73
provision was unconstitutional under this standard.
Addressing next a requirement in the statute that professional
solicitors make certain disclosures, Justice Brennan abruptly concluded
that the provision was a content-based regulation because “[m]andating
speech that a speaker would not otherwise make necessarily alters the
74
content of the speech.” This perfunctory conclusion was the first time
that the Court had explicitly applied content analysis to a charitable
solicitation regulation. Justice Brennan then noted that “North
Carolina’s content-based regulation [was] subject to exacting First
75
Amendment scrutiny.”
The Court concluded that the disclosure provision was
unconstitutional because the means chosen to accomplish the State’s
interest in informing donors were “unduly burdensome and not
76
narrowly tailored.”
Justice Brennan’s choice of wording here is
curiously vague. When Riley was decided in 1988, it was settled doctrine
that courts applied strict scrutiny to a content-based regulation of
77
But rather than follow this standard, Justice
protected speech.
Brennan hedged with the phrase “exacting scrutiny” and avoided the
78
familiar terms of “compelling interest” and “least restrictive means.”
The Court was either deliberately carving out a unique standard of
review for content-based regulation of charitable solicitation or
unnecessarily perpetuating ambiguity and imprecision. Riley made
clear, however, that whatever exacting scrutiny meant, it was the test

72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 795.
75. Id. at 798.
76. Id. The Court opined that “[i]n contrast to the prophylactic, imprecise, and unduly
burdensome rule the State has adopted to reduce its alleged donor misperception, more
benign and narrowly tailored options are available.” Id. at 800.
77. See, e.g., Marc Rohr, Freedom of Speech After Justice Brennan, 23 GOLDEN GATE U.
L. REV. 413, 449–50 (1993) (“The period of the early 1980’s [sic] marked the beginning of the
relatively consistent practices, by the Supreme Court, of clearly distinguishing between
content-based and content-neutral regulations of speech.”).
78. Although the majority in Riley never used the term strict scrutiny, Justice
Rehnquist’s dissent classified the majority’s test as such. Riley, 487 U.S. at 810–11
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The Court concludes, after a lengthy discussion of the
constitutionality of ‘compelled statements,’ that strict scrutiny should be applied and that the
statute does not survive that scrutiny.”).
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that the Court had used in Munson, and by implication, in
79
Schaumburg.
Riley added an additional wrinkle in its analysis of the disclosure
provision. Having concluded that “[m]andating speech that a speaker
80
would not otherwise make” rendered a regulation content-based, Riley
appeared to have announced that any disclosure provision would be
subjected to exacting scrutiny. But Justice Brennan then cited two
examples of compelled disclosures that would be constitutionally
81
permissible—requiring financial disclosure reports and requiring that a
82
professional solicitor disclose his or her professional status. The latter
exception drew disagreement from Justice Scalia, who observed that it
represent[ed] a departure from our traditional
understanding, embodied in the First Amendment, that
where the dissemination of ideas is concerned, it is safer
to assume that the people are smart enough to get the
information they need than to assume that the
government is wise or impartial enough to make the
83
judgment for them.
D. Revisiting Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley
Not surprisingly, the federal appellate courts have split in their
84
interpretations of Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley. The Eighth and
79. Compare id. at 789 (The Court used “exacting scrutiny” in Munson.) with id. at 798
(North Carolina’s content-based regulation is subject to “exacting First Amendment
scrutiny.”).
80. Id. at 795.
81. Id. at 788. Riley noted that Schaumburg had observed that the government would
have been free to require charities to file financial disclosure reports. Id. Leslie Espinoza
asserts that Schaumburg took
an absolutist first amendment approach to fund-raising disclosure statutes,
leaving no room for the Court to balance the potentially different
regulatory interests in charitable solicitation as opposed to charitable
advocacy.
Backed into a corner, the Court issued an internally
contradictory opinion on disclosure and left little opportunity for states to
develop appropriate regulation.
Leslie G. Espinoza, Straining the Quality of Mercy: Abandoning the Quest for Informed
Charitable Giving, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 612 (1991).
82. Riley, 487 U.S. at 799 n.11.
83. Id. at 804 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
84. See Fraternal Order of Police v. Stenehjem, 431 F.3d 591, 597 (8th Cir. 2005)
(“Although the Supreme Court has not specified whether the Schaumburg test is an
intermediate scrutiny review of a content-neutral regulation, we have interpreted it as such.”)
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85

Tenth Circuits have concluded that Schaumburg established a test of
intermediate scrutiny for a content-neutral regulation. Conversely, the
86
87
Third and Eleventh Circuits have cited Schaumburg for the modern
strict scrutiny test. The Fourth Circuit has recently announced that “[i]t
is unclear” whether the Court’s standard amounts to strict scrutiny or
88
intermediate scrutiny. The confusion is equally apparent in the trial
89
courts.
I turn now to the possible reasons for the Court’s confusing guidance
in its charitable solicitation cases. Schaumburg’s difficulties begin with
its failure to address content analysis and tiered scrutiny, even though
both concepts were squarely before the Court. The Village of
Schaumburg asserted in its reply brief that its ordinance should not face
strict scrutiny because it was “[neutral] on its face and neutral in its
(citing Pryor, 258 F.3d at 851); Nat’l Fed. of the Blind of Ark., Inc. v. Pryor, 258 F.3d 851,
854–55 (8th Cir. 2001) (comparing Schaumburg to Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781 (1989)). But see Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 689 (8th Cir.
1992) (noting that Sable Commc’n of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989), quoted
Schaumburg as part of its strict scrutiny formulation).
85. See Am. Target Adver., Inc. v. Giani, 199 F.3d 1241, 1247 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing
Schaumburg for intermediate scrutiny test of content-neutral regulation).
86. See ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 173 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Schaumburg for the
proposition that “[a]s in all areas of constitutional strict scrutiny jurisprudence, the
government must establish that the challenged statute is narrowly tailored to meet a
compelling state interest, and that it seeks to protect its interest in a manner that is the least
restrictive of protected speech”) vacated by Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002); see also
United States v. Local 560 (I.B.T.), 974 F.2d 315, 344 (3d Cir. 1992) (characterizing
Schaumburg as having struck down “a content-based restriction on door-to-door solicitation
because restriction was not sufficiently narrowly tailored”).
87. See Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514,
1542 n.34 (11th Cir. 1993) (“We believe the same can be said with respect to Village of
Schaumburg and the other strict scrutiny cases relied upon by the city.” (citation omitted)).
88. Nat’l Fed. of the Blind v. FTC, 420 F.3d 331, 338 n.2 (4th Cir. 2005). Curiously, the
court concluded that “[r]egardless of the label, the substance of the test is clear.” Id. Cf.
Famine Relief Fund v. West Virginia, 905 F.2d 747, 754 (4th Cir. 1990); Telco Commc’n, Inc.
v. Carbaugh, 885 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1989). The Ninth Circuit has cited Schaumburg in
addressing charitable solicitation regulation but has not explicitly characterized the case
under content analysis or tiered scrutiny. See Kreisner v. City of San Diego, 1 F.3d 775, 788
(9th Cir. 1993) (Schaumburg and other cases hold that solicitation of charitable contributions
is protected speech, and “restrictions on solicitation in traditional public forums must be
narrowly drawn to serve a compelling government interest.”).
89. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Pinellas County, 321 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1296 (M.D. Fla.
2004) (citing Schaumburg as intermediate scrutiny test); Fraternal Order of Police v.
Stenehjem, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1029, 1030 (D.N.D. 2003) (relying on Schaumburg and
asserting both that “[t]he statute does not have to be the least restrictive means of regulation”
and that the restriction “must withstand strict scrutiny”); Tenn. Law Enforcement Youth
Found., Inc. v. Millsaps, No. 89-2762-G, 1991 WL 523878, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 3, 1991)
(citing Schaumburg as strict scrutiny test).
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90

administration.” The Village cited Virginia Board of Pharmacy for the
proposition that “[r]estrictions on the time, place or manner of
expression are permissible provided that ‘they are imposed without
reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they serve a
significant governmental interest, and that in so doing they leave open
91
ample alternative channels for communication of the information.’”
Conversely, the nonprofit group Citizens for a Better Environment
contended that “[o]nly a narrowly-drawn ordinance that serves a
compelling state interest with narrow specificity and is closely drawn to
avoid unnecessary abridgment can survive the exacting scrutiny
92
necessitated by a state-imposed restriction on freedom of speech.” In
essence, then, the parties asked the Court to decide whether the
relevant standard of review was strict or intermediate scrutiny. But
rather than employing the standards briefed by the parties, the Court
ignored content analysis altogether and sidestepped the debate over
whether strict scrutiny was warranted.
The Court’s lack of clarity may be partially attributable to the views
about tiered scrutiny held by the Justices central to the development of
its approach to charitable solicitation. Four Justices were in the
majorities of all three major cases: Justice White (the author of
Schaumburg), Justice Blackmun (who authored Munson), Justice
93
Two years
Brennan (who authored Riley), and Justice Marshall.
before Schaumburg, these same four Justices had expressed their
reservations about tiered scrutiny in the landmark affirmative action

90. Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 6, Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444
U.S. 620 (1980) (No. 78-1335).
91. Id. at 12 (citing Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771 (1976)).
92. Respondents’ Brief at 14, Schaumburg, 444 U.S. 620 (No. 78-1335) (internal
quotations omitted). The Village countered that “[t]he cases cited by the respondents in their
brief simply do not lend any credence to the concept that an ordinance regulating the
solicitation of funds is subject to strict scrutiny.” Petitioner’s Reply Brief, supra note 90, at
10.
93. Schaumburg was an 8-1 decision in 1980, with only Justice Rehnquist dissenting.
Justice O’Connor replaced Justice Stewart in 1981. Munson was decided in 1984 by a 5-4
margin, with Justice Stevens concurring and Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and
O’Connor joining Justice Rehnquist in dissent. Justice Burger’s departure in 1986 resulted in
Justice Rehnquist’s elevation to Chief Justice and Justice Scalia’s introduction to the Court.
The following year, Justice Kennedy replaced Justice Powell. In 1988, Riley was a more
fractured decision with Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Kennedy fully joining Justice
Brennan’s majority opinion. Although Justice Stevens joined the majority in Schaumburg
and Munson and most of the Court’s opinion in Riley, his concurrence in Munson
distinguishes him from the other four Justices in all three majorities.
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94

case Regents of University of California v. Bakke. In their joint partial
concurrence, the Justices found it “necessary to define with precision
95
the meaning of that inexact term, ‘strict scrutiny.’” They contended
that “a government practice or statute which restricts ‘fundamental
rights’ or which contains ‘suspect classifications’ is to be subjected to
‘strict scrutiny’ and can be justified only if it furthers a compelling
government purpose and, even then, only if no less restrictive
96
alternative is available.” But wary of endorsing tiered scrutiny, the
Justices made clear that “[w]e do not pause to debate whether our cases
establish a ‘two-tier’ analysis, a ‘sliding scale’ analysis, or something else
altogether” because “[i]t is enough for present purposes that strict
97
scrutiny is applied at least in some cases.”
The following year, Justice Blackmun distanced himself from his
qualified recognition of strict scrutiny in Bakke. Concurring in Illinois
98
State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, Justice Blackmun
lamented the Court’s ongoing efforts to clarify strict scrutiny:
I have never been able fully to appreciate just what a
“compelling state interest” is. . . . And, for me, “least
drastic means” is a slippery slope and also the signal of
the result the Court has chosen to reach. A judge would
be unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with
something a little less “drastic” or a little less
“restrictive” in almost any situation, and thereby enable
himself to vote to strike legislation down. This is
reminiscent of the Court’s indulgence, a few decades ago,
in substantive due process in the economic area as a
means of nullification.
I feel, therefore, and have always felt, that these
phrases are really not very helpful for constitutional
94. 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, J.J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 357 n.30. Two months prior to Bakke, Justice White, joined by Justices
Marshall and Brennan, had derided any attempt by the Court to recalculate a legislative
balancing of interests. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804 (1978)
(White, J., dissenting) (“What is inexplicable, is for the Court to substitute its judgment as to
the proper balance for that of Massachusetts where the State has passed legislation
reasonably designed to further First Amendment interests in the context of the political arena
where the expertise of legislators is at its peak and that of judges is at its very lowest.”).
98. 440 U.S. 173 (1979).
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analysis. They are too convenient and result oriented,
99
and I must endeavor to disassociate myself from them.
Justice Blackmun, at least, had serious reservations about the
application of strict scrutiny to constitutional matters.
Notwithstanding the apparent hesitancy of some members of the
Court to endorse tiered scrutiny, much of the confusion in Schaumburg
was likely genuine rather than obscurantist. The Court had not yet
settled on a consistent application of either content analysis or tiered
scrutiny in First Amendment cases when it decided Schaumburg, and
the analytical difficulties posed by these emerging concepts were
compounded by the Court’s newfound acceptance of commercial
speech. Virginia Board of Pharmacy announced that commercial speech
would receive some kind of protection, ostensibly something more than
the rational basis scrutiny that the Court had previously applied to
100
commercial speech regulation.
But Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n
made clear that commercial speech would not receive the same
101
protection as other protected speech.
Schaumburg introduced
another complexity by insisting that charitable solicitation was not
simply commercial speech because it “[did] more than inform private
economic decisions and [was] not primarily concerned with providing
102
information about the characteristics and costs of goods and services.”
But nor was there any indication that charitable solicitation was core
political speech. Taken together, Schaumburg and the commercial
speech cases meant that commercial speech received something more
than rational basis scrutiny and charitable solicitation received
something more than the protection afforded commercial speech but
103
This hierarchy proved
less than that given to core political speech.
difficult to keep straight.
99. Id. at 188–89 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
100. Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 779
(1976).
101. 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978).
102. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).
103. The confusion caused by these concepts was evident in footnote 7 of the Court’s
opinion in Schaumburg, which noted that
[t]o the extent that any of the Court’s past decisions . . . hold or indicate
that commercial speech is excluded from First Amendment protections,
those decisions, to that extent, are no longer good law. For the purposes
of applying the overbreadth doctrine, however, it remains relevant to
distinguish between commercial and noncommercial speech.
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The emerging commercial speech doctrine also complicated content
analysis. By the time the Court decided Schaumburg, it was clear that a
content-based restriction of protected speech received strict scrutiny and
a content-neutral restriction received something less than strict scrutiny.
But the Court’s uncertainty of how to address commercial speech and
charitable solicitation left unclear what level of scrutiny would be
applied to content-neutral regulations of those forms of speech. When
Schaumburg signaled that charitable solicitation was “fully protected
speech,” it did so to distinguish charitable solicitation from commercial
104
It did not mean that regulation of charitable solicitation
solicitation.
would always be subject to strict scrutiny because content analysis
required varied levels of scrutiny for all forms of protected speech, even
105
core political speech. Schaumburg’s avoidance of content analysis left
unclear whether charitable solicitation always merited the same degree
of protection as other core speech, or whether, like commercial speech,
106
it sometimes fell into an ambiguous middle category.

Id. at 632 n.7 (citations omitted). The Court did not explain why distinguishing between
commercial and noncommercial speech remained relevant in the context of the overbreadth
doctrine. Three years earlier, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, the Court had cryptically
asserted that “the justification for the application of overbreadth analysis applies weakly, if at
all, in the ordinary commercial context.” 433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977). The only support the
Court offered for this assertion was that “[s]ince advertising is linked to commercial
well-being, it seems unlikely that such speech is particularly susceptible to being crushed by
overbroad regulation.” Id. at 381.
104. The distinction was by no means nontrivial. Tribe has highlighted the importance
of “maintaining some residual distinctions between commercial and ideological expression on
the ground that the former is valued only for the ‘facts’ it conveys while the latter ‘is integrally
related to the exposition of thought—thought that may shape our concepts of the whole
universe of man.’” TRIBE, supra note 9, at 655 (quoting Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 779 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring)). Writing two
years prior to Schaumburg, Tribe cautioned that distinguishing between commercial speech
and other kinds of speech “may be needed if constitutional doctrine is to recognize the
‘commonsense differences between speech that does no more than propose a commercial
transaction and other varieties.’” Id. (quoting Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24).
Ten years later, in the second edition of his treatise, Tribe lamented that “the Court has
repeatedly struggled with defining the differences between commercial and non-commercial
speech, notwithstanding its offhand announcement that the difference between the two is
based on ‘commonsense.’” LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 894 (2d
ed. 1988).
105. Cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 54 (1980) (“The ‘absolutely
protected’ character of the message cannot insulate [all] forms of expression from regulation:
context—the threat the particular expressive event poses—obviously is relevant and
sometimes will be dispositive.”).
106. Cf. KATHLEEN SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1159
(15th ed. 2004) (“[C]ommercial speech continues to stand as the lone formal exception to the
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Unable or unwilling to synthesize the concepts before it, the Court
failed to articulate a workable framework in Schaumburg. Four years
later, the Court’s significant reliance on Schaumburg in Munson
prevented it from drawing upon more cogent developments elsewhere
in its First Amendment jurisprudence. This tunnel vision is particularly
evident when Munson is compared to another First Amendment case
decided just forty-two days earlier, Members of City Council v.
107
Taxpayers for Vincent. Vincent involved a Los Angeles ordinance that
108
Supporters of a
prohibited the posting of signs on public property.
local political candidate contracted with a political sign service company
109
to create and post campaign signs. After the signs were duly removed
110
by the City, the supporters and the sign company sought an injunction.
The Court determined that the ordinance was neutral as to viewpoint
and then cited O’Brien for “the appropriate framework for reviewing a
111
The Court concluded that the Los
viewpoint-neutral regulation.”
Angeles ordinance withstood O’Brien’s test and left open adequate
112
alternative means of communication.
Justice Brennan, joined by
Justices Marshall and Blackmun, dissented, explaining that:
The Court’s first task is to determine whether the
ordinance is aimed at suppressing the content of speech,
and, if it is, whether a compelling state interest justifies
the suppression [citing Consolidated Edison and Mosley].
If the restriction is content-neutral, the court’s task is to
determine (1) whether the governmental objective
advanced by the restriction is substantial, and (2)
whether the restriction imposed on speech is no greater
than is essential to further that objective. Unless both
113
conditions are met the restriction must be invalidated.

two-level approach to speech set forth in Chaplinsky . . . . [I]t enjoys First Amendment
protection, but not as much First Amendment protection as other speech.”).
107. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
108. Id. at 791.
109. Id. at 792.
110. Id. at 793.
111. Id. at 804.
112. Id. at 812.
113. Id. at 821 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

INAZU 12

572

4/14/2009 3:23:35 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[92:551

Disagreeing with the Court’s intimation that the Los Angeles ordinance
114
left open ample means of communication like handbill distribution,
Justice Brennan wrote that:
The message on a posted sign remains to be seen by
passersby as long as it is posted, while a handbill is
typically read by a single reader and discarded. Thus, not
only must handbills be printed in large quantity, but
many hours must be spent distributing them. The
average cost of communicating by handbill is therefore
likely to be far higher than the average cost of
communicating by poster. For that reason, signs posted
on public property are doubtless “essential to the poorly
115
financed causes of little people,” and their prohibition
constitutes a total ban on an important medium of
communication.
Because the City has completely
banned the use of this particular medium of
communication, and because, given the circumstances,
there are no equivalent alternative media that provide an
adequate substitute, the Court must examine with
particular care the justifications that the City proffers for
116
its ban.
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun thus highlighted three
important factors in analyzing a speech restriction: (1) the need to begin
with content analysis; (2) the appropriate test for reviewing a contentneutral regulation; and (3) the importance of considering the potentially
disparate effects of a regulation on “the poorly financed causes of little
117
One month later, these same three Justices joined the
people.”
narrow majority in Munson in an opinion authored by Justice
Blackmun. Yet none of the doctrinal or equitable considerations from
118
Four years later, Riley
the Vincent dissent surfaced in Munson.
alluded to disparate effects and acknowledged the need for contentanalysis but did little else to clarify the ambiguities in Schaumburg and
Munson.

114. Id. at 812.
115. Justice Brennan quoted Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943)
(invalidating a city ordinance that restricted door-to-door distributions of circulars).
116. Vincent, 466 U.S. at 820 (citations omitted).
117. Id. at 820–21.
118. See Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
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E. Subsequent Cases
Less than a year after Riley, the Court issued its decision in Sable
Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, striking down under strict
scrutiny review a ban on “dial-a-porn” telephone messages that were
119
Sable is interesting in the present context
indecent but not obscene.
not for its substantive analysis but for its formulation of strict scrutiny.
Justice White observed that:
The Government may . . . regulate the content of
constitutionally protected speech in order to promote
a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive
means to further the articulated interest. . . . [T]o
withstand constitutional scrutiny, “it must do so by
narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve those
interests without unnecessarily interfering with First
Amendment freedoms.” [citing Schaumburg]. It is not
enough to show that the Government’s ends are
compelling; the means must be carefully tailored to
120
achieve those ends.
Because Justice White had authored Schaumburg, his citation to that
case as part of his strict scrutiny analysis in Sable added further support
to the view that Riley’s “exacting scrutiny” (derived from Schaumburg)
was actually strict scrutiny.
The Court’s only substantive post-Riley discussion of Schaumburg’s
charitable solicitation principles came one year after Sable in United
121
States v. Kokinda.
Kokinda involved a challenge to a Postal Service
119. Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989).
120. Id. at 126.
121. 497 U.S. 720 (1990). Other than Sable and Kokinda, the Court has cited
Schaumburg only seven times since Riley: Davenport v. Washington Education Ass’n, 127 S.
Ct. 2372, 2382 (2007) (citing Schaumburg for overbreadth doctrine); McConnell v. Federal
Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 140 (2003); Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003)
(overbreadth doctrine); Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 538 U.S.
600, 611 (2003); Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536
U.S. 150, 163 (2002) (citing Schaumburg for principle that “our cases involving nonreligious
speech” show that “the Jehovah’s Witnesses are not the only ‘little people’ who face the risk
of silencing by regulations like the Village’s”); International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 677–78 (1992); and Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S.
576, 581 (1989) (overbreadth doctrine). Of these, only Madigan discusses Schaumburg in
detail (and it leaves unaltered the Court’s approach to charitable solicitation). 538 U.S. at
612–17. Madigan involved a fraud prosecution of a professional charitable fundraiser. Id. at
617. The Court made clear that its “opinions in Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley took care to
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regulation that permitted charitable advocacy but not charitable
122
solicitation.
A plurality of the Court began its analysis by citing
Schaumburg and Riley for the proposition that “[s]olicitation is a
123
The
recognized form of speech protected by the First Amendment.”
plurality continued that “[u]nder our First Amendment jurisprudence,
we must determine the level of scrutiny that applies to the regulation of
124
125
protected speech at issue.” Applying forum analysis (which had not
been at issue in Schaumburg, Munson, or Riley) and content analysis,
the plurality concluded that the content-neutral Postal Service
regulation governed a nonpublic forum and upheld the constitutionality
126
of the regulation under rational basis scrutiny.
Although the Justices disagreed on the application of forum
127
analysis, Kokinda is most interesting for its parsing of solicitation and
advocacy. Joined by Justice Kennedy, the plurality approved of the
regulation’s content-neutral distinction “because solicitation is
128
In
inherently disruptive of the Postal Service’s business.”
Schaumburg, the Court appeared to have foreclosed such an easy
separation of solicitation and advocacy, having pronounced that
“solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and
perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for
129
Kokinda’s
particular views on economic, political, or social issues.”
distinction between solicitation and advocacy is also tenuous because it
appears to discriminate based on content. Mosley had indicated that
regulations making subject matter distinctions were content-based, a
view that the Court reinforced five months after Schaumburg in
Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Public Service Commission of
130
New York. In light of these cases, the Kokinda plurality’s reasoning is
leave a corridor open for fraud actions to guard the public against false or misleading
charitable solicitations.” Id.
122. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 722–23.
123. Id. at 725.
124. Id.
125. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983);
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302–03 (1974).
126. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 732–33.
127. See, e.g., id. at 741 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 732 (plurality opinion). The issue of content analysis provoked an extended
exchange between the plurality and the dissent. See id. at 733–36; id. at 753–54, 760
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
129. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).
130. 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) (“[A] constitutionally permissible time, place, or manner
restriction may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech.”).
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Stevens questioned this assertion, arguing that
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questionable. It is unlikely, for example, that a regulation excluding
religious advocacy would have been subjected to rational basis scrutiny
simply because the Postal Service believed that religious advocacy was
more disruptive than other forms of advocacy.
IV. A NEW TEST FOR CHARITABLE SOLICITATION
I have argued above that the Court’s failure to incorporate the
concepts of content analysis and tiered scrutiny in Schaumburg,
Munson, and Riley and the ambiguous relationship between charitable
solicitation and commercial speech have produced an ill-defined test for
reviewing charitable solicitation regulation. The Court exacerbated
these problems with its decisions in Sable and Kokinda, which modified
its approach to charitable solicitation with the seemingly contradictory
suggestions that: (1) Schaumburg had applied strict scrutiny to a
regulation governing charitable solicitation; and (2) charitable
131
solicitation was less protected than Schaumburg had implied.
The best way to bring a more coherent approach to judicial review of
charitable solicitation regulation is to reconcile Schaumburg with
current understandings of content analysis, tiered scrutiny, and
commercial speech. In doing so, we should also take care to recognize
the value of charitable solicitation in a democratic polity, the kind of
normative concern that can too easily be lost in rigid application of
doctrinal formulas. With these doctrinal and normative concerns in

every lawyer who has read . . . our cases upholding various restrictions on
speech with specific reference to subject matter must recognize the
hyperbole in [Mosley’s] dictum: ‘But, above all else, the First Amendment
means that the government has no power to restrict expression because of
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.’
Id. at 545 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Stone’s 1978 article intimated that subject
matter restrictions were in some “intermediate position” between content-based and contentneutral restrictions and might be “properly subject to a more variable sort of analysis.”
Stone, supra note 6, at 100; see id. at 83. More recently, the Court has been less than clear
about subject matter distinctions. Compare Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 723 (2000)
(“Regulation of the subject matter of messages, though not as obnoxious as viewpoint-based
regulation, is also an objectionable form of content-based regulation”) with id. at 724 (A
regulation that distinguishes between speech activities likely to have the consequences against
which it seeks to protect and speech activities unlikely to have those consequences “cannot be
struck down for failure to maintain ‘content neutrality.’”).
131. One way to reconcile these two developments is to characterize Schaumburg as a
strict scrutiny test of a content-based regulation, which would mean that a content-neutral
regulation like that at issue in Kokinda would be subject to a lesser degree of scrutiny.
Schaumburg’s lack of any content analysis makes this characterization difficult to sustain.
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mind, I argue for a more flexible approach to charitable solicitation
regulation rooted in a balancing of interests. I turn now to the project of
constructing that approach.
A. The First Amendment Value of Charitable Solicitation
I base my approach to charitable solicitation regulation on a “civic
conception of free speech” that pays particular attention to forms of
132
speech that advance self-governance and democratic discourse. From
this framework, I suggest that regulation of charitable solicitation should
be carefully scrutinized for three reasons: (1) the link between
charitable solicitation and advocacy; (2) the inequalities among different
kinds of charitable organizations; and (3) the disparate effects of
content-neutral regulation on smaller and less popular charitable
organizations.
1. Solicitation and Advocacy
One of the challenges of a civic conception of the First Amendment
is brought to light when the government regulates speech in order to
133
protect the privacy interests of an unwilling listener.
Two seemingly
incommensurable interests—speech and privacy—are pitted against
each other, and we must consider what factors should be considered in
striking an appropriate balance between these interests. Settled
doctrine points to the location in which the speech occurs as one factor
134
to consider.
A more civic-minded approach might also consider the
content of the speech—the degree to which the speech contributes to
the democratic project. But a civic approach goes beyond even this
instrumental value. As Robert Post has suggested:
To include speech within public discourse is to signify
that it is constitutionally valued not merely for the
132. SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 28. Sunstein links this civic conception to Justice Louis
Brandeis’s famous concurrence in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis,
J., concurring). Sunstein describes Justice Brandeis’s theory as rooted in “classical republican
thought, with its emphasis on political virtue, on public-spiritedness, on public deliberation,
and on the relationship between character and citizenship.” SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 27.
133. The privacy interests of an individual were famously advanced by Justice Brandeis
and his law partner, Sam Warren. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890) (defining privacy as the right “to be let alone”).
134. For example, the Court has observed that the government’s interest “in protecting
the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free
and civilized society,” and that “[o]ne important aspect of residential privacy is protection of
the unwilling listener.” Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988).
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contribution it may make to public discussion, but also,
intrinsically, for the engagement it represents in the
public life of a nation. A democracy cannot flourish
unless its citizens actively participate in the formation of
its public opinion. Such participation is “precious” and
135
to be encouraged for its own sake.
The civic importance of charitable solicitation stems partly from the
link between solicitation and advocacy. Even the act of solicitation can
itself be a form of advocacy. In Schaumburg, the Court stated that
“solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and
perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for
particular views on economic, political, or social issues, and . . . without
solicitation the flow of such information and advocacy would likely
136
cease.” Solicitation is also linked to advocacy because solicitation may
fund speech undertaken on a separate occasion. Justice Scalia alluded
to this in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission: “an attack upon
137
the funding of speech is an attack upon speech itself.”
These observations hold not only for charitable solicitation but also
for other forms of solicitation, including commercial solicitation and
panhandling. Is there a principled distinction between these latter forms
of solicitation—neither of which receives elevated First Amendment

135. Post, supra note 41, at 20. Post contends that the Court’s charitable solicitation
cases hold “that charitable solicitations are part of public discourse rather than commercial
speech.” Id. at 20 n.86.
136. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980); see
also Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 798 (1988) (criticizing the state’s
assumption that “the charity derive[d] no benefit from funds collected but not turned over to
it” because “where the solicitation is combined with the advocacy and dissemination of
information, the charity reaps a substantial benefit from the act of solicitation itself”). The
Court provided an example of an organization whose advocacy interests are directly
advanced by solicitation in Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 538 U.S.
600, 622 n.11 (2003) (“Telephone solicitors retained by [Mothers Against Drunk Driving]
‘reach millions of people a year, and each call educates the public about the tragedy of drunk
driving, provides statistics and asks the customer to always designate a sober driver.’”).
137. 540 U.S. 93, 253 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Scalia cited Schaumburg and several other cases to support his contention. See also TRIBE,
supra note 104, at 829–30 (“Solicitation of contributions, wherever it takes place” is an
activity that has “historically been recognized as inextricably intertwined with speech or
petition” and its regulation “must therefore be assessed with particular sensitivity to the
possible constriction of that breathing space which freedom of speech requires in the society
contemplated by the first amendment.”); Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 45 (“Central to any
meaningful right of speech are the resources necessary to exercise the right.”).
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protection—and nonfraudulent charitable solicitation?
In Young v.
New York City Transit Authority, the Second Circuit suggested that
panhandling failed to implicate core First Amendment values:
The only message that we are able to [discern] as
common to all acts of begging is that beggars want to
exact money from those whom they accost. While we
acknowledge that [subway] passengers generally
understand this generic message, we think it falls far
outside the scope of protected speech under the First
Amendment. We certainly do not consider it as a
“means indispensable to the discovery and spread of
139
political truth.”
The Supreme Court expressed a similar view about commercial speech
in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, observing that commercial speech
was afforded “a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its
140
subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values.”
These distinctions are not impervious to challenge. Young was
written over a vigorous dissent from Judge Meskill, who noted that the
panhandler plaintiffs had stated in affidavits that “they often speak with
potential donors about subjects such as the problems of the homeless
and poor, the perceived inefficiency of the social service system in New
York and the dangerous nature of the public shelters in which they
141
sometimes sleep.” Jed Rubenfeld has similarly posited that begging is
political speech “from a certain, perfectly plausible point of view
142
sounding in political theory, sociology, and so on.”
But Sunstein
offers a different perspective:

138. The state can always regulate fraudulent charitable solicitation. See Madigan, 538
U.S. at 612 (“Like other forms of public deception, fraudulent charitable solicitation is
unprotected speech.”).
139. 903 F.2d 146, 154 (2d Cir. 1990).
140. 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
141. Young, 903 F.2d at 165 (Meskill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
142. Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 801 (2001);
see also Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, Begging to Differ: The First Amendment and the
Right to Beg, 104 HARV. L. REV. 896, 899 (1991) (“The beggar may describe in her plea why
she has been forced to beg, and the begging may lead to a discussion of larger issues. But
even if the beggar conveys nothing more than that she wants the listener to give her money,
this information contributes to the collective search for truth.”).
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[I]t is plausible to think that almost all speech is political
in the sense that it relates in some way to the existing
social and political structure. Commercial speech and
obscenity are examples. But if some people understand
the speech in question to be political, it cannot follow
that the speech qualifies as such for constitutional
purposes, without treating almost all speech as
143
political.
Elsewhere, Sunstein observes that the absence of constitutional
protection for some forms of speech “owes at least something to the
common-sense judgment that different values are placed on different
144
categories of speech.”
Although my contention that there is a principled distinction
between charitable and other forms of solicitation is contestable, it is no
145
Moreover,
less plausible than any line-drawing short of absolutism.
my distinction tracks similar demarcations made elsewhere, notably, in
the federal tax code, which extends favorable benefits to many
146
charitable organizations but not to commercial entities or beggars.
2. The Distinctions Within Charitable Solicitation
As a practical matter, charities compete for limited financial
resources with unequal ability.
As the umbrella organization
Independent Sector argued in its amicus brief in Riley: “[s]olicitations
and communications about the substance of a charity’s work, especially
when oral, are inherently fragile—each contact involves competition for

143. SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 132.
144. Id. at 125.
145. Justice Brandeis, for example, argued that the government could abrogate the right
of free speech “in order to protect the state from destruction or from serious injury, political,
economic or moral.” Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). Justice Brandeis provides a partial answer as to when the protection of the state
might justify a restraint on speech: The evil should be “so imminent that it may befall before
there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the
falsehoods and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be
applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression.” Id.
at 377. This, of course, only bounds the indeterminacy; it does not eliminate it. (What is an
emergency? Who decides imminence? What constitutes a falsehood, and by whose
standards?) Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 149 (“There is no way to operate a system of free
expression without drawing lines.”).
146. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(1)–(28) (2006) (containing extensive definitions as to which
entities qualify as “exempt organizations”).
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the citizen’s limited time, attention and money.”
Leslie Espinoza
makes a similar contention, noting that “at least theoretically, there is to
148
some extent a limited ‘pool’ of potential charitable contributions.”
According to Espinoza, this constraint became visible in the years
following World War II, when “[e]xponential growth in communication
and the mechanization of solicitation, both through direct mail appeals
and telephone appeals, opened new opportunities to reach donors and
149
increased competition for contributions.”
Because increased
150
competition “lowered the revenues of established charities,” these
charities “consciously promoted” fund-raising limits “to restrict diversity
151
and competitiveness within the charitable community.”
Under
Espinoza’s thesis, the states, persuaded by larger established charities to
enact greater regulation, actually diminished the diversity of viewpoints
in the charitable sector.
Espinoza’s perspective is consistent with the Court’s observation
that regulation of professional charitable solicitation disproportionately
152
These charities include law
affects small or unpopular charities.
enforcement foundations, veterans groups, and social advocacy groups
whose purposes are unmistakably among those of core political speech:
endorsing legislation, promoting messages and programs in the interest
of public welfare and safety, and furthering the causes of marginalized
groups. Regulations that vanquish these voices from the public square,
whether directly or indirectly, endanger “those processes of
communication that must remain open to the participation of citizens if
153
democratic legitimacy is to be maintained.”

147. Brief for Independent Sector et al. as Amici Curiae supporting Appellees, Riley v.
Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (No. 87-328). (“Amici include advocacy
organizations (of all political stripes), who also must overcome many citizens’ discomfort with
troubling issues and viewpoints. Accordingly, any compelled disclosure, especially when on a
topic not chosen by the organization, tends to chill free speech by diverting the citizen’s
attention and undercutting the good will that links solicitor and citizen.”).
148. Espinoza, supra note 81, at 654.
149. Id. at 635.
150. Id. at 654.
151. Id. at 610. Espinoza highlights the protectionist bias of established charities that
was evident in a report issued by an ad hoc committee of academics and representatives from
corporations and nonprofit organizations. Id. at 650. This report advocated that serviceoriented charities would be better off with “a smaller number and a greater joint effort.” Id.
at 651 (quoting VOLUNTARY HEALTH AND WELFARE AGENCIES IN THE UNITED STATES:
AN EXPLORATORY STUDY BY AN AD HOC CITIZENS COMMITTEE 30 (R. Hamlin ed., 1961)).
152. Riley, 487 U.S. at 799.
153. Post, supra note 41, at 7.
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3. The Disparate Effects of Content-Neutral Regulation
Regulation of charitable solicitation will seldom if ever be contentbased under the current test for content analysis articulated in Ward v.
154
Rock Against Racism. The government will rarely attempt to regulate
charitable solicitation out of disagreement with the message it conveys,
but will typically do so in order to advance government interests
unrelated to the content of expression such as public safety, fraud
155
prevention, or residential privacy. Accordingly, these regulations will
156
be subject to less than strict scrutiny.
But putative distinctions
between content-neutral and content-based regulations threaten
diversity in the charitable sector because, as Kenneth Karst has
observed, “regulations that are formally neutral as to speech content”
157
Justice Marshall,
may result in “de facto content discrimination.”
joined by Justice Brennan, expressed a similar concern in his dissent in
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, decided three days
before Munson.
[T]he Court has dramatically lowered its scrutiny of
governmental regulations once it has determined that
[time,
place,
and
manner]
regulations
are
content-neutral. The result has been the creation of a
two-tiered approach to First Amendment cases: while
regulations that turn on the content of the expression are
154. 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
155. Government regulation of professional charitable solicitation may take the form of
subject-matter or speaker-based restrictions, but will seldom be viewpoint-discriminatory.
156. Of course, a regulation deemed to be content-based under Ward would be subject
to strict scrutiny and would likely be unsustainable.
157. Karst, supra note 13, at 35, 37. Karst viewed this kind of discrimination as
“presumptively invalid” under the First Amendment’s “equality principle.” Id. at 37. For
Karst, “[t]he principle of equality, when understood to mean equal liberty, is not just a
peripheral support for the freedom of expression, but rather part of the ‘central meaning of
the First Amendment.’” Id. at 21 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273
(1964)). A showing “that a formally neutral law has discriminatory effect deserves great
weight in persuading a court to look closely at the necessity for the regulation.” Id. at 39. For
more on the concept of de facto differential effects of content-neutral regulations, see
SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 171 (Some content-neutral restrictions “may foreclose important
expressive outlets and have profound content-differential effects.”); TRIBE, supra note 9, at
682–83 (“Even a wholly neutral government regulation or policy, aimed entirely at harms
unconnected with the content of any communication, may be invalid if it leaves too little
breathing space for communicative activity, or leaves people with too little access to channels
of communication, whether as would-be speakers or would-be listeners.” (emphasis in
original)); Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, supra note 38, at 221 (There
can be “de facto content-differential effects of content-neutral restrictions.”).

INAZU 12

582

4/14/2009 3:23:35 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[92:551

subjected to a strict form of judicial review, regulations
that are aimed at matters other than expression receive
only a minimal level of scrutiny. The minimal scrutiny
prong of this two-tiered approach has led to an
unfortunate diminution of First Amendment protection.
By narrowly limiting its concern to whether a given
regulation creates a content-based distinction, the Court
has seemingly overlooked the fact that content-neutral
restrictions are also capable of unnecessarily restricting
158
protected expressive activity.
Justice Marshall elaborated in a footnote:
[A] content-neutral regulation does not necessarily fall
with random or equal force upon different groups or
different points of view. A content-neutral regulation
that restricts an inexpensive mode of communication will
fall most heavily upon relatively poor speakers and the
159
points of view that such speakers typically espouse.
The problem with contemporary scrutiny of content-neutral
regulations is that it focuses on the legitimacy of the government’s
action but ignores the impact of the regulation on the speaker. As
Stephen Gottlieb has argued, the Court’s adoption of neutrality “shifted
its gaze” from the behavior of the speaker which meant that “many
problems, such as . . . limitations on access to information and access to
opportunities for political broadcast and inexpensive speech, [became]
160
relatively less visible.” Once the perspective shifted from the behavior
of the speaker to the behavior of government, “governmental interests
161
no longer had to be particularly weighty; they only had to be pure.”

158. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 312–13 (1984) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 313 n.14; see also Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 38, at 57
(“[T]he Court long has recognized that by limiting the availability of particular means of
communication, content-neutral restrictions can significantly impair the ability of individuals
to communicate their views to others. This is a central first amendment concern: to the extent
that content-neutral restrictions actually have this effect, they necessarily dampen the search
for truth, impede meaningful participation in self-governance, and frustrate individual
self-fulfillment.”); cf. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, supra note 38, at
192 n.5.
160. Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 34.
161. Id. at 36.
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In the area of charitable solicitation, the more burdensome
regulations usually threaten less established charities. The reason for
this inverse relationship is unsurprising: large charities often have either
an established donor base or sufficient in-house employees or
volunteers to conduct solicitations; small or unpopular charities,
particularly those without a donor base or name recognition, often have
to undergo the “necessary evil” of relying on professional charitable
162
solicitors. The Supreme Court has also recognized this reality, noting
that some disfavored methods of solicitation are “essential to the poorly
163
and that “small or unpopular
financed causes of little people”
164
charities” must “usually rely on professional fundraisers.”
The
disparate effects of regulating charitable solicitation thus endanger the
very speakers that the First Amendment should most staunchly protect.
A civic conception of the First Amendment requires scrutiny of even a
content-neutral regulation to ensure that any disparate effects are
considered in light of the democratic project at stake.
B. The Need for Balancing
Kathleen Sullivan has observed that “[t]he suspension of categorical
reasoning in favor of [intermediate scrutiny] typically comes about from
a crisis in analogical reasoning” when “[a] set of cases comes along that
just can’t be steered readily onto the strict scrutiny or the rationality
165
Schaumburg and its progeny fall within Sullivan’s
track.”
166
As a practical matter, strict scrutiny of charitable
observation.
solicitation regulation is implausible under the Court’s current
framework for content analysis because a regulation will almost never

162. See Note, Developments in the Law—Nonprofit Corporations (pt. 4), 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1634, 1635 (1992).
163. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943).
164. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 799 (1988).
165. Kathleen Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and
Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 297–98 (1992) (“‘Intermediate scrutiny,’ unlike the poles
of the two-tier system, is an overtly balancing mode. . . . Where intermediate scrutiny governs,
the outcome is no longer foreordained at the threshold. Instead of winning always or never,
the government may sometimes win or sometimes lose—it all depends.”); see also Bendix
Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“We sometimes make . . . ‘balancing’ judgments in determining how far the needs of the
State can intrude upon the liberties of the individual, but that is of the essence of the courts’
function as the nonpolitical branch.” (citation omitted)). But cf. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 583
(Strict scrutiny also involves a kind of balancing.).
166. Sullivan also points out that balancing has been vituperated by both liberal and
conservative jurists in different political contexts. Sullivan, supra note 165, at 316–17.
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be aimed at the content of the charitable message itself.
More
substantively, strict scrutiny could hinder the state from protecting
important interests like fraud prevention and residential privacy.
Rational basis scrutiny, on the other hand, fails to account for the
168
fundamental speech interests at stake in charitable solicitation.
Balancing, as an alternative, “tends to make the articulation and
169
A
comparison of competing rights and interests more explicit.”
carefully constructed balancing test—despite the risk inherent in the
discretion it leaves to individual judges—may be preferable to either of
170
the more rigid alternatives of strict or rational basis scrutiny.
C. Formulating a New Test
A judicial test for the regulation of charitable solicitation should
account for the concerns identified above. It should also reflect the
principles of content analysis and tiered scrutiny now ensconced in First
Amendment law. I turn now to constructing such a test, using as a
starting point the Eighth Circuit’s decision in National Federation of the
171
Blind of Arkansas, Inc. v. Pryor.
Pryor involved a challenge to an Arkansas statute that required a
telephone charitable solicitor to end the solicitation when requested to
172
After examining Schaumburg and
do so by the recipient of the call.
Ward, the Eighth Circuit noted that the standards enunciated in those
173
cases were “obviously very similar.” Without explicitly announcing its

167. Even regulations that distinguish between professional charitable solicitors and inhouse solicitors are at most speaker-based restrictions, which “are not always considered the
practical equivalent of content restrictions, so long as the ground on which speakers are
classified can be described as related to some aspect of their status independent of their
beliefs or points of view.” SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 106, at 1199. Similarly,
regulations restricting charitable solicitation as a whole are at most subject matter restrictions,
a classification that might be subject to “a more variable sort of analysis.” Stone, supra note
6, at 100.
168. See Espinoza, supra note 81, at 612.
169. Sullivan, supra note 165, at 301.
170. Ely observed that “balancing tests inevitably become intertwined with the
ideological predispositions of those doing the balancing—or if not that, at least with the
relative confidence or paranoia of the age in which they are doing it—and we must build
barriers as secure as words are able to make them.” Ely, supra note 18, at 1501. Ely was
writing specifically about regulations that proscribe messages because they are dangerous,
and although my invocation of his words decontextualizes the quote, the abstracted principle
retains its importance.
171. 258 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 2001).
172. Id. at 854.
173. Id. at 855.
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own test, the court reviewed: (1) whether the state had a legitimate
interest; (2) whether the interest was significantly furthered by a
regulation narrowly tailored to meet that interest; and (3) whether the
174
These
regulation substantially limited charitable solicitation.
principles may be reformulated as follows:
A content-neutral regulation of charitable solicitation
will be sustained if the regulation furthers a legitimate
interest and the interest is significantly furthered by a
narrowly tailored regulation that does not substantially
175
limit charitable solicitation.
The critical prong of the Pryor test is whether the regulation
“substantially limits” charitable solicitation. This emphasis forces a
balancing of interests because it examines the degree of the burden that
the government’s regulation places on charitable speech. But while
Pryor comes closer to a workable standard than Schaumburg, it remains
unsatisfactory for three reasons:
1. Pryor unnecessarily expands an already subjective intermediate
scrutiny review by supplanting Turner’s “important or substantial”
interest with a “sufficient or legitimate” interest that hovers closer to
rational basis scrutiny than to an elevated standard of review. Although
the important or substantial formulation is itself malleable and subject
to abuse, terminology consistent with precedent provides a modicum of
accountability.
2. Pryor’s use of the phrase “significantly furthers” unnecessarily
introduces an additional subjective factor to the test. If a regulation is
narrowly tailored to advance an important or substantial interest, a
subjective assessment of the degree to which the regulation advances
that interest adds little substantive value to the test. The “significantly
furthers” inquiry can also unwittingly slip a strict scrutiny standard into
an intermediate scrutiny review. Suppose an unchallenged law requires
a charity to disclose X in order to advance the state’s interest in
preventing fraud. Suppose further that a new law requiring the
compelled disclosure of X + Y is challenged on First Amendment

174. Id. at 855–56.
175. Id. at 854–55. Although my formulation differs slightly from the test explicated by
the court at the beginning of Pryor, it is consistent with the language used by the court in its
substantive analysis.
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grounds. Assuming that both regulations are content-neutral, the state
need not show that X + Y is the least restrictive means of advancing its
interest in fraud prevention. But if X + Y must significantly further the
state’s interest, the charity could argue that, given the existence of X,
the marginal benefit of Y does not significantly further that interest.
This leaves the state with justification only for disclosure of X. The
charity thus indirectly forces the state to comply with a standard more
akin to a least restrictive strict scrutiny despite the content-neutrality of
176
the regulation.
3. Pryor’s “substantial limitation” component tilts too restrictively
against the government. By intimating that a regulation cannot
substantially limit charitable solicitation, Pryor introduces a nearabsolute presumption reminiscent of strict scrutiny. Some contentneutral regulations may justifiably substantially limit or even foreclose
charitable solicitation, just as some content-neutral regulations limit
other forms of protected speech. Precluding the government from any
regulation that substantially limits solicitation skews the balance against
the government’s ability to regulate.
Pryor’s test can be modified to address the three concerns described
above by: (1) replacing “sufficient or legitimate” with “important or
substantial”; (2) removing the “significantly furthers” requirement; and
(3) adding a balancing component that is effectuated if the regulation
substantially limits charitable solicitation. These adjustments produce
the following test:
A content-neutral regulation of charitable solicitation
will be sustained if it furthers an important or substantial
interest through a narrowly tailored regulation that does
not substantially limit charitable solicitation (unless the
harm the regulation prevents clearly outweighs the harm
177
caused by the regulation’s limitation).
176. A similar critique can be made of the commercial speech test developed in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 561–
66 (1980). Under Central Hudson’s second prong, the government “must demonstrate that
the challenged regulation ‘advances the Government’s interest “in a direct and material
way.”’” Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 625–26 (1995) (quoting Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995) (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993))).
177. Although I confine this proposed test to the scope of this Article—charitable
solicitation—the test has potentially broader applicability as a modification of the
intermediate scrutiny formulation in Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,
661–62 (1994).
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This test, of course, introduces its own vagaries. But premised on the
need for a balancing of interests, it is a more transparent representation
of that balancing. It also invites courts to consider the potentially
disparate effects of content-neutral restrictions.
The balancing component in the parenthetical of the proposed test is
conditional: it operates only when a regulation substantially limits
charitable solicitation. A narrowly tailored content-neutral regulation
that furthers an important or substantial government interest should be
upheld if its limitation on charitable solicitation is insubstantial. But the
substantial limitation requirement operates as a check against my
elimination of Pryor’s requirement that a regulation significantly further
the government interest. Consider again a disclosure requirement X.
Removing the “significantly furthers” requirement allows the state to
regulate X + Y even if Y is only marginally effective and therefore
protects my test from becoming a de facto least restrictive means test.
But left unchecked, the state could rely on this rationale to require
disclosure of X + Y + Z and beyond. At some point, the aggregate
effect of these disclosures may cause considerable harm to a charity.
The substantial limitation language forces the parenthetical balancing
test when this occurs. When a court concludes that the limitation is
substantial, the balancing test favors the charitable speech over the
restriction by requiring that the harm prevented by the regulation
clearly outweigh the harm that it causes. This initial position accords
with a speech-protective view and signals to legislatures that they must
account for the speaker’s interests in crafting their regulations.
The balancing component also recasts the government’s stake from
the importance of the government interest to the harm that the
regulation prevents. The focus on harm encompasses both the gravity of
the government’s interest and the regulation’s effectiveness in furthering
that interest. In this way, the parenthetical in my proposed test
recaptures the “significantly furthers” aspect of Pryor, but this inquiry is
only made when the regulation substantially limits speech.
V. CONCLUSION
Although I have argued for a test that more adequately protects the
values of charitable solicitation, the Court’s test is ostensibly already
speech-protective: Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley all struck down
attempts to regulate charitable solicitation. My critique, however, is
structural rather than results-oriented. I have argued that the test
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derived from Schaumburg lacks coherence, clarity, and doctrinal
sustainability. The most direct support for my contention is the inability
of lower courts even to agree whether the Court’s test is one of strict
scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny. When interpreted as the former, the
test is inconsistent with the application of content analysis in other areas
of speech regulation. When interpreted as the latter, Schaumburg fails
to account adequately for the civic interests at stake with charitable
speech. My concern is the same that Robert Post has expressed with
respect to commercial speech:
Commercial speech doctrine is now almost a quarter of a
century old.
Yet in all that time it has never
systematically queried its own justifications and
implications. By settling quickly and easily into a test
whose bland provisions were indifferent to a disciplined
account of the constitutional value of commercial speech,
the doctrine has allowed fundamental differences of
perspective to fester and increase. These differences
178
now threaten to explode the doctrine entirely.
My aim has been to propose an alternative test that reflects greater
179
My argument has been chiefly analytical,
clarity and transparency.
but it also contains a normative element: the Court’s inability to
establish a coherent test has exposed an important form of speech to an
unwarranted risk of overregulation. This assertion flows from my view
that the protections of the First Amendment should be at their highest
for political speech and that charitable solicitation is a kind of political
speech. I have thus adopted a broader conception of political speech
than some. But I have also argued for principled line-drawing that
prevents an exceptional category of speech from being swallowed by the
whole. Thus, for example, I have contended that neither begging nor
commercial speech warrant the same level of protection that should be
extended to charitable solicitation. Others might argue that both of
those forms of speech contribute to a rich and diverse civic discourse as
much as charitable solicitation. These discussions need to be taking
place with greater frequency. Principled distinctions between different
forms of speech, and even distinctions between speech and non-speech,
have become increasingly thin. To take but one obvious example, we
178. Post, supra note 41, at 54–55.
179. Cf. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 63 (rev. ed. 1969) (“The desideratum
of clarity represents one of the most essential ingredients of legality.”).
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have amply demonstrated that, when it comes to pornography, we
180
haven’t known it when we’ve seen it.
Evolving technology will ensure that the regulation of charitable
181
solicitation remains a timely legal issue,
and First Amendment
jurisprudence must be capacious enough to resolve unforeseen
challenges as the speech interests underlying charitable solicitation
continue to intersect in new ways with competing interests. Left
unaltered, Schaumburg’s test may be incapable of meeting those
challenges; indeed, it may be reduced to an “abstract concept” that
becomes “filled with whatever content and direction one can manage to
182
put into [it].”

180. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
181. See, e.g., FTC v. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc., 345 F.3d 850, 855 (10th Cir. 2003)
(upholding distinction between charitable and commercial solicitation under the national donot-call registry); see also First Spam and Spim, Now ‘Spit:’ VoIP Annoyance Defies
Regulatory Categorization, 73 U.S. LAW WEEK, Nov. 30, 2004, at 2316 (describing “spit” as “a
next-generation annoyance that delivers unsolicited commercial messages to users of Internet
telephony”).
182. STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT’S A GOOD
THING, TOO 102 (1994).

